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Lender Liability: The Legal and Management Effects on the Hospitality
Industry
Abstract

With the savings and loan crisis and the tail end of a recession at hand, the '90s are bound to be a difficult
decade for the financing of hospitality operations through borrowing from commercial lenders. The authors
discuss one of the least known dangers associated with borrowing, lender liability. The issue is discussed from
both a legal and managerial perspective.
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Lender Liabilitv:
Legal and ~anagemehtEffects
on the Hospiality Industry
by

John L. Myers
and
Bruce S. Urdang

With the savings and loan crisis and the tail end of a recession at
hand, the '90s are bound to be a difficult decade for the financing of
hospitality operations through borrowing from commercial lenders.
The authors discuss one of the least known dangers associated with
borrowing, lender liability. The issue is discussed from both a legal
and managerial perspective.

Individuals involved in upper level management who have been
properly advised by counsel are becoming increasingly aware of the
legal issues surrounding t h a t relatively new area of the law
commonly referred to as "lender liability," The rights and liabilities
between a borrower (the hospitality management) and a lender
(traditionally a commercial bank, savings and loan, retirement1
pension fund, and insurance company) have changed significantly
over recent years.
Under certain circumstances, a lender could be held legally
responsible to third parties for the wrongful acts or omissions of the
borrower.' The possibility of such liability has had a profound effect
not only on the nature of the borrowerflender relationship and the
structure of loan agreements, but also on the decisions rendered by
the management of hospitality operations. Management has had to
recognize the fact that lenders are increasingly wary of becoming
entangled in the myriad legal problems which beset all hospitality
operations. The effect has been a significant change in management
procedures and attitudes.
Often the law will hold one person vicariously liable to a third
party for the acts of another merely due to the relationship between
the parties. One example is the liability placed upon an employer for
the acts of his employee. Just because of the relationship, one person
is responsible for the acts of another as if those acts were his own.
Such vicarious liability could attach to a lender with regard to the acts
of a borrower. For such liability to attach, the relationship between
lender and borrower must, in many ways, be more than what one
might consider the traditional lenderhorrower relationship.
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Traditionally, a lender will charge interest as the consideration it
is to receive for a loan. The only obligation placed upon the borrower
is to re-pay the principal with the agreed-upon interest. The only
right the lender has is to receive the sums owed. Increasingly,
however, lenders have sought to increase the profitability of lending
by making "participatory" loans. Lenders receive an ownership
interest in the borrower's business, often a percentage of the profits.
To protect that ownership interest, many such loans include the
delegation of management responsibilities to the lender. It is such
"participatory" loans which could result in lender liability.
Are the Lender and Borrower Partners?
According to the Uniform Partnership Act, all the members of a
partnership are liable for the acts of the other partners which are
related to the partnership business. A lender who has made a
participatory loan to a borrower might be so entangled in the daily
operations of the borrower that the lender appears to be a partner
and therefore liable for the "partnership" debts.
A partnership is defined as a n association of two or more
persons to carry on a business for profit as co-owners. The hallmarks
of such an association are as follows:
Intent to form a partnership: No person can be a partner with
another without intending to do such. In this context, however, intent
can be inferred by the parties' acts. The parties might even deny that
they are partners; however, if they act like partners, the law will
consider them such.
Community of interest: This means having the right to manage
the affairs of the business or utilize or dispose of business property. The
key is the right to manage. Exercising that right is not necessary.
Contrast such management authority with a lender's right to veto
certain transactions of the borrower which in some way might endanger
the lender's collateral. Such an arrangement would not be considered a
community of interest and would be a "safe" right for a lender to reserve.
Co-ownership: The most p o w e f l indicator of co-ownership of a
business is the sharing of profits. ORen lenders will receive a share of
the profits of a business as payment on the debt or interest on a loan.
Not all such loan terms will make a lender a partner of the borrower,
even though such a lender might look like a partner. The key,
therefore, is the ability to distinguish loans from capital investment.
Power of control: A creditor who takes over a debtor's business
to collect on a debt or who is involved in the debtor's day-to-day affairs,
might be considered the debtor's partner. A lender may appropriately
monitor or protect its interest in collateral without running the risk of
being branded a partner.
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In attempting to make such an often difficult distinction, the
single most significant factor will be whether or not the obligation to
re-pay the funds is contingent upon the success of the business."
Partners, in addition to sharing profits, share losses. If the
obligation to re-pay is absolute, regardless of the success of the
business, no co-ownership exists, even if the amount of the payments
were to vary with the profits of the business. Such is the rule in
nearly every state. No inference of partnership is created by the
repayment of lent money out of the first proceeds of a business or out
of its profits. It is where the money advanced is risked in the
business that the courts will hold that co-ownership exists:

Tb constitute a loan the money advanced must be returnable

in any event.... It is not a loan if repayment is contingent upon
the profits, for in such a case it is made not upon the personal
responsibility of the borrower, but upon the security of the
business; and where the money is risked in the business,it
strongly tends to show t h a t the contract was one of
partnership, and not a mere loan.3

In many cases, lenders go further. Instead of extracting only
interest as remuneration for a loan, they also receive profits. Such
additional interest, in the form of profits, in and of itself does not
transform a loan into a capital investmenL4
One final situation involves a lender who, according to the loan
instrument, is to continue to receive a percentage of profits of the
borrower even after the entire principal and interest have been
repaid. There is no case directly holding that such an arrangement
will be tantamount to a community of interest. However, one court
has held that one of the primary characteristics of a loan is the
~ corollary to that
existence of principal sums o u t ~ t a n d i n g .The
proposition is that no lenderhorrower relationship can exist if there
is no outstanding principal owed and, therefore, if the relationship is
not one of lenderhorrower, it must be something else, such as a
partnership.
One can only speculate as to how such an argument might be
received. The best advice would be to not become the test case and to
avoid loans which permit the payment of profits after the principal
has been repaid. Some loan transactions attempt to accomplish the
same result by providing the lender not with a payment of profit
after the principal is paid, but granting the lender an option to
become a partner in the borrower's business at some specified time
in the future. The time specified might be after the principal has
been paid. Because the lender will exercise that option only if the
business is, in fact, profitable, the option is in effect an agreement
whereby the lender is agreeing to share in profits if they ensue, but
not to share in any losses. Such an option arrangement has been
held not to constitute a partner~hip.~
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Is the Borrower the Lender's Agent?
Another ground upon which vicarious liability for the acts of a
borrower could be thrust upon a lender is that of basic principles of
agency law. A principal is vicariously liable for the acts of his agent
conducted within the scope of the principal's business. To put this
proposition of law into the context of t h e lender-borrower
relationship, Section "0" of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
states the following:

A creditor who assumes control of his debtor's business for the
mutual benefit of himself and his debtor, may become a
principal, with liability for the acts and transactions of the
debtor in connection with the business.

An agency relationship can be created in two ways. The first is
by consent, one person agreeing to act on behalf of another. The
other is as stated above, by a lender exercising control over the
business of the borrower for the mutual benefit of both. Notice that
for such agency liability to attach, actual exercise of control, not
merely the right to control must exist, unlike the partnership
analysis above. The Restatement of Agency goes on to state the
following:
The point at which the creditor becomes a principal is that at
which he assumes de facto control over the conduct of his
debtor, whatever the terms of the formal contract with his
debtor may be.
It is important to note that a lender who acts merely to protect
its collateral through a veto power over transactions such as mergers
and acquisitions or the sale of substantially all of the borrower's
assets will not be considered the borrower's principal. Likewise, a
lender with veto power over transactions which are above a certain
dollar amount or who has the power to enforce rights of the borrower
against a third party will not have vicarious liability for the acts of
the borrower thrust upon it.
Securities Liability Differs
Both federal and most states' securities laws state that a
person who is in control of a n issuer of securities will be
vicariously liable for such issuer's violation of the securities
statutes. The meaning of the term "control" for securities law
purposes is not the same as set forth in the partnership or agency
analysis. In fact, the courts are somewhat split as to the standard
to be applied for the imposition of liability. Some courts have held
that for such liability to attach to a lender, the lender must have
more than the mere right to control the transaction in question.
Some evidence of actual participation in the securities law
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violation is needed. Such is referred to a s t h e "culpable
participation" r e q ~ i r e m e n t . ~The requirement that the lender
have actual knowledge of the conduct and actively participate in
the violation offers some fairly strong protection to lenders. That
can be contrasted with a recent federal court opinion8 wherein it
was stated that the right to control the transaction in question
even without proof that such control was actually exercised could
be enough to hold a lender vicariously liable for a borrower's
securities law violation. Therefore, lenders which might be aware
that an insolvent borrower is considering selling securities to raise
capital should insist that the legality of any security offering be
certified by independent counsel.
Management has had to recognize the fact that lenders are
increasingly wary of becoming entangled in the myriad legal
problems which beset all hospitality operations. The effect has
been a significant change in management procedures a n d
attitudes for both borrower and lender.
One such effect has been management's recognition of the
dangers which accompany any delegation of management
responsibility to a lender. Most lenders require some degree of
control over the operations of the borrower if i t is to make a
participatory loan. Such loss of control over its own operation may
not be desirable to management, especially if the lender to whom
decision making authority is being delegated is not knowledgeable
about the nature or operations of the borrower's business. A
hospitality operator does not know how to manage the operations
of a lending institution; why, then, should lenders be expected to
know how to manage a hospitality operation? Clearly, a
hospitality operator should be circumspect about delegating
decision making authority to persons with little or no hospitality
industry experience.
Managers Must Explore Options
Before entering into any participatory loan agreement with a
lender, management must explore other, more traditional lending
arrangements. Perhaps the obligation to re-pay the loan should be
absolute and not contingent in any way on the success of the
business. This would effectively exclude t h e lender from
participating in the business operations. However, lenders might
find themselves unwilling to lend if the rewards it is to receive are
not great enough, and, therefore, they might insist on a share of
profits. Management's need for funds may be the determining
factor when trade-offs with a lender are required. Ownership,
profits, and control are surely the heart and soul of business
ownership. Involving and permitting others to participate in this
process must be evaluated carefully based on the willingness of
lenders to make non-participatory loans and the borrower's need
for financial support.
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The risks which lender liability places upon a lender involved
in a participatory loan with a hospitality operation are enormous.
Should a borrower be determined by a court to be liable to a third
party for breach of contract or for some violation of the law, not
only does the lender risk the possible insolvency of the borrower
and its inability to re-pay the loan, but the lender itself may have
to step into the shoes of the borrower and make good on its
obligation.
A lender contemplating making such a loan must consider
such potential liability. Perhaps such risks do not justify the
return that such a loan would generate. If, after considering such
risks, the lender concludes that such a loan would make economic
sense, t h e n t h e lender m u s t obtain legal advice so t h e
responsibilities, duties, and respective authority of the partners
can be clearly spelled out. The lender must be certain to obtain
enough control in order to protect its interest in the business. It
must then devote sufficient resources to properly and effectively
exercise such control.
The lender must also recognize its own infirmities with regard to
its ability to manage the borrower's business. Just as a borrower
should be circumspect about tendering control of its business to a
lender which knows little about managing a hospitality operation, a
lender must recognize that just because it is knowledgeable about
the business of providing financial services, it may be quite ignorant
about how to manage an ongoing business. If so, a wise lender would
not enter into a participatory loan.
The common thread running through all of the grounds upon
which a lender might be held liable for the act of a borrower is
control. A wise lender who recognizes the risks involved with
participatory lending will refrain from exercising control over the
day-to-day operations of the borrower unless i t h a s made a
conscious decision that it wants the rewards associated with such
a high risk loan and it dedicates the resources needed to properly
and effectively participate in the borrower's business. A lender
who does not wish to risk lender liability will be certain that the
obligation of t h e borrower to re-pay t h e loan is absolute,
regardless of the success of the business, even if the lender is to
receive a share of the profits as part of the consideration for
making the loan.
Owners and managers of hospitality operations, on the other
hand, should be cautious as to their positions with lenders. The
relationship could be one of bliss or one of courting disaster. The
pros and cons of participatory loans, legal entanglements, risk
venture, and overall control must be viewed with skepticism as well
as opportunity. The uninformed borrower or lender is sure to suffer.
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